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no means been wholly eradicated from contemporary existence in the West, uncanny though they may be. Here, I would cite Jameson's pertinent observation that oppositional scholars today need to reappropriate an authentically dialectical concept of ontology, or collective social being, an observation which he draws from the writings of Raymond Williams, Ernst Bloch, and Jean-Paul Sartre.5 I would also cite Martin Heidegger's key hermeneutic concept regarding thefacticity of Being, or the notion that "even if we ask, 'What is 'Being'?, we [nevertheless] keep within an understanding of the 'is,' though we are unable to fix conceptually what that 'is' signifies" (Being and Time 24-25). In "The Writer and His Community," Achebe himself has argued that while cultural differences should be respected, they should not be emphasized to the extent that one falls "into the trap of seeing the differences as absolute rather than relative" (59).6 Thus, while Achebe has consistently attacked the universalizing impulses within colonialist criticism and discourse, he nevertheless recognizes that totalizing philosophies of difference are both dogmatic and counter-productive insofar as they dismiss hermeneutic understanding altogether. In this sense, we may also reread Appiah's concern about the way in which African artists seem to be recast into the role formerly assumed by alienated modernist artists-namely, to be productive "otherness machines" for a vacuous First World marketplace-as a parallel rejection of the "post-structuralist" insistence on non-identity wherein the possibility of sameness is absolutely rejected.
Instead of focusing upon the disintegration of the basic psychic coordinates or mechanisms of Achebe's Igbo,7 in the following essay, we will focus upon the emphatically historical question of pre-European Igbo being in Things Fall Apart, especially as it pertains to the larger objectives of contemporary post-colonial theory. In this regard, I will suggest that Achebe's description of Igbo community life functions not only as a Fanonian "negation of a negation" (or counter-weight against previous literary distortions of Africa),8 but it also functions as a prophetic affirmation of post-colonial Africa's future by offering a teleological vision of a postCartesian or collective subjectivity. Achebe's depiction of the pre-European Igbo may therefore be brought into alignment with more recent efforts by post-colonial theorists like Abdul R. JanMohammad, Edward W. Said, Fredric Jameson, and many others to introduce a uniquely post-individualistic and collective subject-position, symbolically located at the "other end of historical time" (Jameson, "Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan" 110).9
Achebe and Western Philosophy
In a lecture given at UCLA in 1984, Achebe has described Rene Descartes as both "the father of Western philosophy" and "the cause of a gigantic philosophical accident" ("The Writer and His Community" 50-51). Specifically, Achebe rejects the narrowness and egocentrism of Cartesian philosophy, or the cogito ergo sum of Descartes, which, he argues, functions as a defining aspect of contemporary life in the United States, for Achebe, the historical site of an enormous "ontological accident" (51). As a foil to Descartes, Achebe also suggests that, in the unlikely event that Socrates, Plato, or Augustine returned to the modern era, they would no doubt find African community life, like that which is described in Things Fall Apart, more appealing to them than Western individualism (50-51). To emphasize the utopian dimensions of these thinkers, Achebe remarks that The Republic... was after all a grand design for the ordering of men in society; and The City of God a Christian reordering of society after the destruction of the Roman Empire by pagans. In other words, philosophy for Plato and Augustine, historically equidistant from Christ, was concerned with architectural designs for a better world.
Expanding upon this thesis, Achebe particularly singles out Augustine by stating that, while recent Western literature and theory has encouraged us to think of contemporary social existence as life within a prison-house,10 he himself prefers the Catholic or Augustinian vision of social being defined as "other-centered fulfillment," or as a potentially benign "presence limiting the space in which the self can roam uninhibited" (53).11
Though unexpected, Achebe's views on Augustine tend to remind us of a fact that nearly fifteen hundred years of Christian domination in the West have tended to obscure: namely, that Augustine's City of God is primarily mystical and theurgical rather than legislative (O'Meara xxx). In this sense, Augustine does not so much offer an oppressive blueprint for Roman Catholic theocracy, as much as he offers an astonishing vision of a better world, a utopian standard by which earthly and corrupt cities may be measured and found wanting. Obviously, as a Neo-platonist philosopher, Augustine draws upon Plato's Republic in drafting his own new "republic" that is refracted through the lens of Christian doctrine and mysticism. While in Things Fall Apart Achebe does not really offer an elaborate utopian scheme like Plato in The Republic, he does create an alternative universe or reality in which community life indeed turns upon the Augustinian notion of "other-centered fulfillment" that is lauded in Achebe's speech: the notion of community life as a "presence" that deliberately and creatively restricts the freedom of individuals, but in non-oppressive ways (Achebe, "The Writer and His Community" 53).
In this sense, Achebe aims not only at rehabilitating Africa's pre-colonial past; he also wants his novel to fulfill a more primal human need by providing "an alternative handle on reality" (58). To this end, Achebe lauds Frank Kermode's definition of fictional reality as "'something we know does not exist but which helps us to make sense of, and move in, the world"' ("The Truth of Fiction" 139); and he rejects Milan Kundera's definition of the novel as "'an investigation into human existence ... [that] proclaims no truth, no morality'" because it denies the novel's also important didactic and social functions ("The Writer and His Community" 55). In other words, far from evading political and social responsibility to community, Achebe asserts that the task for the novelist is rather to imaginatively bring into being a wholly "different order of reality from that which is given" ("The Truth of Fiction" 139, my emphasis).
However, it should be clear that if Things Fall Apart offers an alternative vision of a pre-Cartesian and pre-alienated African past, it does not necessarily follow that the ontological aspects of Achebe's novel may therefore be conflated with the theological ones, which would be equivalent to suggesting that Achebe's description of the precolonial Igbo is essentially Edenic or mythical. On the contrary, Achebe describes an emphatically historical form of social existence, which nevertheless remains utopian in character. First, Achebe does not hesitate to dramatize the very real socio-historical crises and contradictions among the Igbo people, many that exist long before the arrival of the British, and that later create opportunities for the spread of Christianity. In fact, it is by now commonplace to assert that post-colonial African writers like Achebe, in recreating the pre-colonial past, wish to demonstrate that the era before the arrival of Europeans was neither idyllic nor savage, but was instead "composed of real and vulnerable people, their ancestors, not the figments of missionary and colonialist imaginations" (Lawrence 9).12 However, Achebe goes further than this by insisting that Africa's pre-colonial past was in many ways creatively superior to its historical European counterpart.13 Taking issue with reviewers of Yambo Ouologuem's Bound To Violence, for example, Achebe argues that, while pre-colonial Africans certainly had their share of faults, they nevertheless were not responsible for the basic historical fact of racism's existence, especially as a systematic doctrine or creed (79).14 Another way of saying this might be that, while Achebe's Igbo in Things Fall Apart do not inhabit an Edenic paradise, they nevertheless are not guilty of essentializing the Other on the basis of race, which is a distinctly European problem. Additionally, Achebe suggests that his Igbo do not suffer from the harmful attributes of a Cartesian and alienated world-view, or from a primal detachment from being itself. In short, if the Igbo in Achebe's novel do not live within an idyllic paradise, they do inhabit a utopian space that is free from the contradictions of both Cartesian logic and racist ideology.15
Malignant Fictions: or, Achebe and Historical Situation
Before delineating the more formal features of this non-Cartesian utopian space, it is important to acknowledge, at least in passing, the documented failures or obvious social contradictions of the pre-colonial Igbo in Things Fall Apart, especially their "caste" system, their practice of ritual murder (whether due to oracular promptings, or due to their fear of biological twins), and their oppressive patriarchy, particularly evident in the case of Okonkwo. In his essay "The Truth of Fiction," Achebe himself offers one helpful way of approaching these problems when he praises a scientific study of infant mortality in modern-day Nigeria, which he describes as both "poignant" and "perspicacious" (142), and when he criticizes the practices of a contemporary Nigerian witch-doctor, which he describes as both "maniacal" and "pitiful." However, for Achebe, Dr. Sanya Onabamiro's Why Our Children Die does not necessarily offer a better solution to the problem of infant mortality in Nigeria merely because he offers a scientific one; rather his ideas are preferable because they are both imaginatively and creatively superior to those of his superstitious counterpart. Hence, Achebe argues that the insights given by Dr. Onabamiro into the problem of high infant mortality, however incomplete future generations may find them, are infinitely more helpful to us than the diagnosis of a half-mad religious fanatic. In conclusion, there are fictions that help and fictions that hinder. For simplicity, let us call them beneficent and malignant fictions. Thus, while Nwoye may be overwhelmed by the poetry of the new religion, he is actually indifferent to its objective content, which he does not understand.l7 For similar reasons, the stigmatization of specific tribal members as osu, or taboo outcasts, also tends to facilitate the success of the Christian missionaries (111), though Achebe seems to imply that the problem of patriarchy among the Igbo is more specific to Okonkwo rather than the tribe as a whole. In other words, Okonkwo's misogyny is largely a personal failing, resulting from the exaggerated shame and aversion he feels for his father (9-10). Still, throughout the novel, the attitudes of Igbo men towards women are often depicted by Achebe as both harmful and repressive at best. 18 We may conclude then that if Achebe believes the pre-colonial Igbo enjoyed a less alienated form of social existence before the arrival of the British, he also implies that it was, in many instances, a less humane one. Even Okonkwo, for example, is sickened by the death of Ikemufuna, though he himself plays the largest role in it (44). Later, Achebe describes Obierika, a tribal elder, as being disenchanted with oppressive Igbo traditions such as the "throwing away" of twins and other seemingly arbitrary social customs (87), the former affecting him personally. Towards the novel's conclusion, Achebe also states that "there was a growing feeling [among the Igbo] that there might be something in [the new religion] after all, something vaguely akin to method in the overwhelming madness" (126). Besides the question of the twins, the osu, and other unsatisfactory tribal customs, this growing feeling about the new "lunatic religion" is also strengthened by the fact that the British had significantly improved the local economy, so that now "much money flowed into Umuofia." Additionally, to the increasing dismay of Okonkwo, the Igbo become appreciative of the white man's medicine as well as his government and his schools (128-29).
Nevertheless, Achebe's even-handedness in depicting the positive imports of British culture should not blind us to the novel's more fundamental aim: that is, as we have already seen, to create a wholly alternative fictional reality as a means of engaging and modifying existing colonial and post-colonial societies (Achebe "The Truth of Fiction" 139). In this regard, what may be most remarkable about Things Fall Apart is its ability to both deploy and subvert the traditional European novel form itself in the service of purposes distinct from those which have historically defined it. Specifically, Achebe transforms the "bourgeois epic" of homelessness and alienation into a recuperative celebration of collective social existence. In his essay "Language and The Destiny of Man," for example, Achebe, states specifically his view that "language is not inherent in man-the capacity for language, yes; but not language. Therefore there must have been a time in the very distant past when our ancestors did not have it" (88, my emphasis). The implications of the theoretical distinction made by Achebe have been developed most fully in Heidegger's Being and Time (1926), where Sprache, or the ordinary language of daily life, is separated from Rede, which is defined as the ontologically prior human faculty for ordinary discourse (203-4). In this sense, Achebe's belief about the dual nature of language may not be incidental to his descriptions of the pre-colonial Igbo in Things Fall Apart but may instead be that which enables him to explore the dramatic possibilities of an alternative form of subjectivity, which is fundamentally nonalienated, pre-Cartesian, and collective in orientation.
Pre-Colonial Igbo Ontology in Things Fall
In other words, while Heidegger advocated that we develop a new relationship to language, rejecting our present-day relationship with language as a barrier that prevents us from an experience of ontological plenitude, Achebe creates an alterna-tive utopian reality in Things Fall Apart wherein its inhabitants enjoy the kind of relationship with their language that Heidegger advocated. However, I am not suggesting that the actual Igbo people themselves enjoyed such a non-alienated relationship with their language, which is of course both immaterial to my thesis and indeterminate. In fact, Achebe himself asserts that his descriptions of the Igbo people are "merely localized impressionistic illustrations taken from [his] own experience of growing up in Ogidi in the 1930s and 1940s" ("The Igbo World and Its Art" 66), and he also suggests that the world of his childhood probably exists at present only in his dreams (67). Hence, whatever the Igbo people actually are or were, the fact remains that the text of Achebe's Things Fall Apart, like that of Heidegger's Being and Time, functions in the first instance as a socially symbolic attempt to imagine a radically alternative form of community existence in which human experience is not based upon a Cartesian subject-object duality, and in which human beings enjoy a more dynamic, non-alienated relationship to their language.
Heidegger's notion of Dasein [Being-there] suggests that, before the "nightmare" of post-Socratic history, human beings first existed in a world in which the human mind was not fundamentally distinct from matter. However, it is crucial to Heideggerian thought that there also must have existed a semantic dimension to the world of Dasein [or, the nonsubjective individual] before that world could be expressed linguistically. Heidegger's Rede [Speech], like Achebe's notion of an innate human "capacity" for language, is therefore the ontologically prior "openness" without which it would be impossible for Sprach [articulated language] to come into being. Like Schleiermacher and Humboldt, Heidegger then establishes two distinct spheres of language, a higher realm in which authentic meaning may occur and a lower realm of common, ordinary or "fallen" language.22 However, while in the early Heidegger, Dasein [or "man"] serves as Being's privileged space of disclosure, the later Heidegger moves towards a more radical anti-humanism in which Dasein is no longer the ultimate locus of truth and meaning. In other words, the later Heidegger, not unlike the later Saussure, makes the emphatically anti-Cartesian assertion that it is language and not the subject that speaks (Unterwegs zur Sprache 12). Furthermore, the later Heidegger also suggests that it is in poetic language itself, or poetic language as Logos, that the ultimate "unconcealment" [alethia] of both truth and being occurs. But he also insists that Rede, defined throughout his writings in terms of ontological silence, must remain the necessary precondition for the "unconcealment" of Being (Erlauterungen zu Hilderlins Dichtung 69).
In contemporary Western society, which Achebe has characterized as an ontological "mistake," it is commonly assumed that language originates from the speaking subject, a notion that Achebe dramatically rejects in his depiction of the pre-colonial Igbo. In other words, if Heidegger depicts the individual being [or Dasein] as the object (rather than the subject) of metaphysical thought, Achebe depicts the precolonial Igbo in Things Fall Apart as similarly inhabiting a world in which there seem to be no speaking subjects in any strictly Cartesian sense. For example, when the Umofia Igbo are called by name from outside their huts, they exhibit a marked suspicion of their language, which they seem to view as an autonomous, powerful, and reifying force: . The word is therefore not only outside the monadic subject; it is also "a living potential in the human interior" (Ong The Presence of the Word 232). As George Steiner puts it, "language is a 'third universe' midway between the phenomenal reality of the 'empirical world' and the internalized structures of consciousness" (81, my emphasis).27 Humboldt himself writes, "Even though language is wholly inward, it nevertheless possesses at the same time an autonomous, external identity and being which does violence to man himself" (82).
In Things Fall Apart, as we have seen, Achebe shows us how the Igbo possess an uncanny awareness of language's often harmful and alienating nature, the powerful being of language that evokes in its subjects of Igboland the greatest caution and dread. This is most evident, for example, in the case of Ikemufuna of whom the Oracle demands a ritual sacrifice. However, we are also shown how the Igbo are not (as in Barthes, Derrida, and other poststructuralists) the "pure" products or "constructs" of their language (that is to say, the purely powerless products of human language), but they are instead endowed with a strikingly logocentric and powerful individualism, an in-dwelling ability to determine their own fate, status, and well-being within the real or historical world.28 This is especially evident in the case of Okonkwo whom, Achebe informs us, is "one of the greatest men of his time" (6).
In the opening lines of the novel, Achebe states plainly that Okonkwo's considerable fame throughout the land is the result of his "solid personal achievements" (3), and that Okonkwo is a man "clearly cut out for great things" (6). Achebe also emphasizes that Okonkwo's flaws, as well as his strengths, are uniquely his own, rather than the result of any specific social or historical contradictions among the Igbo people. Okonkwo's fear of failure, for example, is described by Achebe as "deeper and more intimate than the fear of evil and capricious gods and of magic" (9). In Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon has observed that "every ontology is made unattainable in a colonized and civilized society" (109). Like Fanon, Achebe suggests that for the pre-colonial Igbo to be inducted into colonial society, the abandonment of a previously more collective social form of existence is henceforth mandated, so that the physically painful construction of a colonized subjectivity may be violently imposed upon the native: namely, a Manichean subjectivity. It is in this sense that the second half of Achebe's Things Fall Apart dramatically depicts the peripeties of the Manichean drama, or it depicts the "slow composition of [the] self as a body in the middle of a spatial and temporal world" (Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks 111). The concluding tragedy of Okonkwo is therefore the tragedy of a novel-hero for whom it is utterly impossible to undergo Fanon's Manichean restructuration of self and world.
Nevertheless, a strictly Fanonian approach to Things Fall Apart, as we have seen, cannot finally do justice to the complexity of Achebe's novel, nor to the historical situation to which encomiastic novels like Things Fall Apart respond. This is, in part, because Fanon (like most theorists of his generation) fails to take into account the unavoidably logocentric basis of his own philosophical position, most evident in his precipitous dismissal of Tempels' La philosophie bantoue. If Fanon, Cesaire, and others once had good reason for marginalizing the largely well-intended (if untimely) efforts of Tempels', there may now be good reason for us to reevaluate this road not taken.
In other words, while the ultimate priority of Africa's basic material needs must be continually reasserted within the first world context, as Ngugi rightly reminds us, the West's present course of steadfast and deliberate deafness to these needs makes such condemnations seem unhelpful luxuries, the privileged rancor of a comprador intelligentsia. In the American academy, for example, where the "pragmatic" and neoLiberal separation of the spheres of the personal from the political routinely prohibits "deontological" moral praxis,31 it seems unlikely that any significant changes in present attitudes towards relations of uneven distribution of the world's economic resources will be forthcoming. In such a context, it may well be asked how such reform can take place until the dramatic lifeworlds of Africans like Achebe can be effectively transported into the interpretive horizons (or "lifeworlds") of those who inhabit the more privileged West. Whatever the historical significance of Things Fall Apart for modern Nigerians and other postcolonial Africans, what may therefore be most crucial about Achebe's novel for us today is the hermeneutic understanding that it engenders, its effective clearing of our own false prejudices so that our most basic humanity may be awakened.
However, if Achebe's novel is successful in this regard, its success stems from the fact that it addresses a truly transcultural, even universal, dilemma of post-oral humanity, which is not strictly an economic question: that is to say, the demise of what Ong calls "oral-aural" cultures wherein the Eventness of the Spoken Word is increasingly forgotten (The Presence of the Word 17). It is therefore entirely fitting that Okonkwo's tale concludes with his cryptic marginalization as a brief footnote within the history text of a British colonizer. While Okonkwo's tragedy is specific to colonial Igboland, and to the colonial encounter throughout the African continent, it also speaks to many far-reaching aspects of humanity's changing relationship to language during the last six hundred years.32 In this sense, the story of Okonkwo does not really belong to Africa alone but to the entire human race. 
